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NOTES AND COMMENTS
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE AT TRIAL: OF BALANCING AND
OTHER MATTERS
EVIDENCE of the accused's past criminal history-prior convictions at trial,
pleas of guilty, acquittals for technical reasons, arrests, and police or private
suspicions-have traditionally been viewed with distrust in Anglo-American
law.1 Probably the principal reason for limiting the use of "other crimes"
evidence at trial has been the fear that such evidence will prejudice the jury
against the accused.2 The notion of prejudice encompasses two distinct tend-
encies of jurors. The first is the tendency to convict a man of the crime charged,
not because he is guilty of that offense, but because evidence introduced
indicates that he had committed another unpunished crime or that he is a
"bad man" who should be incarcerated regardless of his present guilt.3 A con-
viction for this reason would violate the principle that a man may be punished
only for those acts with which he has beerl charged. 4 The second is the tend-
ency to infer that because the accused committed one crime, he committed the
crime charged. In many instances this inference rests on no greater foundation
than the belief that commission of one crime indicates a propensity to commit
1. See MCCORMICIC, EVIDENCE § 157 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; WIG-
momE, EVIDENCE §§ 193-94 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. France and some
other civil law countries use such evidence extensively. See 1 WIGMoRE § 193.
For a discussion of other crimes evidence generally, see Stone, The Rule of Exclusion
of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 H. v. L. REv. 954 (1933) [hereinafter cited as
Stone I]; Stone, The Rule of Exchsion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARv. L.
REv. 988 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Stone II]; Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of
Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment, 31 ORE. L. REv. 267 (1952) ; Ladd, Credibility
Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166 (1941); Trautman, Logical or Legal
Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REv. 385, 403-10 (1952) ; Slough & Knight-
ly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REv. 325 (1956).
On the various kinds of evidence which may be admitted to prove other crimes, see
text at notes 40-45 infra.
2. See 1 UNDERHIML, CanInNAL EVIDENCE § 205 (5th ed. 1956).
Relevant other crimes evidence may also be excluded because it unfairly surprises the
accused by requiring him to meet charges not contained in the indictment or pleadings,
tends to confuse the jury or distract them from the main issue, or takes up too much time
of the court and parties. See United States v. Klein, 131 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
See also 1 WIGMORE § 194.
3. See 1 WIGMORE § 57, at 456; id. § 194, at 650.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 357 (1795). See also A.
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YALE L.J. 1149, 1173-74 (1960) (mentioning some recent undesirable relaxations to the
rigidity of this requirement).
The "bad man" image will be particularly damaging in those few jurisdictions in which
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others. 5 Convictions based on this equation are disapproved because of the
limited probity of propensity evidence.6 Whatever statistical data may demon-
strate about the likelihood of repeated crimes in a given group of offenders,
it says little about the guilt of an individual defendant. 7 Recognizing both
these jury tendencies, American courts have generally excluded other crimes
evidence which proves no more than "criminal disposition" or "criminal char-
acter," reasoning that the possibility of inflaming jury sentiments outweighs
the limited relevance of such evidence."
Yet in some cases other crimes evidence may be rationally probative of
guilt. The accused may have committed a prior offense in a manner similar
to that used in the crime charged, or he may have committed the type of
crime in question several times. The closer the similarity of the other crime
to the crime charged, the greater would seem its relevancy to the issue of
commission.9 At a trial for burglary, for example, evidence that an accused
had committed four previous burglaries of a type similar to the one in question
might be rationally persuasive when connected with other evidence such as
proximity to scene of crime and identification by witnesses. This record may
also cast doubt on a defense such as mistake or inadvertance. 10
Probity and prejudice are not, of course, mutually exclusive characteristics.
Probative evidence may still be inflammatory. It may also have a persuasive
effect far greater than its merits, leading jurors generally to distrust all the
evidence offered by the accused."1
the jury is also charged with sentencing. See Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penl
Code, 23 LAW & CONTEI P. PROB. 528, 532 (1958).
5. 1 WIGmoRE § 194, at 650 ("the over-strong tendency to believe the defendant guilty
of the charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts").
6. See, e.g., Railton v. United States, 127 F.2d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 1942).
7. Considerable work has been done in the field of predicting the likelihood of recidi-
vism of prisoners and juvenile delinquents. See, e.g., OHLIN, SELECTION FOR PAROLE 43-
46, 52, 124-30 (1951) ; Glueck, Status of Glueck Prediction. Studies, 47 J. CRIM. L., C. &
P.S. 18 (1956).
Criticism of these efforts, however, has been fierce. See WOorroN, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND
SOCIAL PATHOLOGY 182-84 (1959); cf. Goodman, Generalizing the Problem of Prediction,
17 Am. Soc. REv. 609 (1952).
One of the findings of the studies which conflicts with the opinion of most courts and
laymen is that most types of sex offenders have a low recidivism rate. See LANGLEY
PORTER CLINIC, CALIFORNIA SEXUAL DEVIATION RESEARCH, FINAL REPORT 100 (1954).
But cf. ELLIS & BRONCALE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX OFFENDERS 26, 33-37 (1956).
8. See, e.g., Swam v. United States, 195 F.2d 689, 690 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Lovely v.
United States, 169 F.2d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 1948) ; State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 21-22, 175
P.2d 1016, 1022 (1947). See generally MCCORMICK § 157.
9. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 168 Cal. App. 2d 549, 552-53, 338 P.2d 504, 506 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1959) ; Trautman, supra note 1, at 406; Lacy, supra note 1, at 268-69; 2 WIG-
MoRE § 302.
10. Cf. United States v. Brand, 79 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Edwards v. United States,
18 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1927). See generally McKusick, Techniques in Proof of Other
Crimes to Show Guilty Knowledge and Intent, 24 IOwA L. REv. 471 (1939).
11. Thus the jury will tend to accept the arguments of the prosecutor and the testimony
of prosecution Witnesses where it contradicts the version presented by the "bad man" and
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The trial judge must attempt to strike a balance between the conflicting
characteristics of other crimes evidence, ensuring that the jury will consider
all evidence relevant to the accused's guilt without being influenced by unduly
prejudicial information.' 2 Admission of some prejudicial information seems
inevitable. Even if the trial judge could control all unauthorized mention of
other crimes, the probity of some other crimes evidence might require its ad-
mission despite prejudicial content. It is frequently assumed that the trial
judge can cure or mitigate the effects of juror contact with inflammatory
evidence by appropriate instruction, admonition, and by striking evidence
from the record when its introduction is unauthorized. 13 There is one great
virtue to the "curative" notion: it greatly simplifies judicial administration
by reducing the number of mistrials, new trials, and reversals for prejudice.
Recent tests on "credibility" evidence, however, tend to confirm the widely
held -view that instructions to the jury to ignore prejudicial other crimes
evidence, or to limit its use to a certain issue, are ineffective. 14 Prosecutors
know this, and treatises on advocacy recognize its importance.' 5 Indeed, some
defense attorneys would rather have no instruction on such evidence, fearful
that a judicial reminder will stir the memory of jurors, and give the evidence
still more weight.' 6
Similarly, little control over the jury's use of other crimes evidence can
be expected from techniques for looking behind the inscrutable general verdict.
his attorney. See, e.g., Dennison v. State, 17 Ala. App. 674, 677, 88 So. 211, 214 (1921)
("rendered the jury less inclined to listen or give proper weight and consideration to what-
ever was offered or said in his defense"). See Note, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 935 (1936)
("juries may either omit entirely to estimate the probabilities of a given proposition, or
accept it as more highly probable than it is"); cf. Note, 12 TEMPLE L.Q. 496, 496-97
(1938) (jury reliance on and influenced by prosecutor) ; Note, 54 CoLuai. L. REv. 946,
947 (1954) (same).
12. See State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 378-79, 218 P.2d 300, 306 (1950) ; MORGAN,
MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON EVIDENCE 382-83 (1957) ; Stone I, supra note 1, at 954.
13. See, e.g., Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897) ; Pitts v. State, 211
Miss. 268, 292, 51 So. 2d 448, 458 (1951). Commentators reject this curative notion, but
admit that courts generally follow it. See Note, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 946, 965-67 (1954);
Note, 36 COLUm. L. REv. 931, 941 (1936).
Alternatively, an erring counsel may avoid mistrial on reversal by voluntarily, quickly,
gracefully retracting his remarks. See Note, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 941 & nn.73-74 (1936).
Sometimes matter is considered too prejudicial to be cured by the court. See, e.g.,
Leonard v. United States, 277 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Carlile v. State, 129 Fla. 860, 176
So. 862 (1937).
14. The jury study tests are discussedat note 89 infra and accompanying text. See
Justice Jackson's oft-quoted remark in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453
(1949) : "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to
the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." See also Lacy, supra
note 1, at 277 ("A pregnant question even though successfully objected to may do about
as much harm as a question answered.") ; McCORMIcK § 43 at 93, § 53 at 122-23; 3 WG-
MoRE § 988.
15. See Davis, Limitations Upon the Prosecution's Summation to the Jury, 42 J. CalM.
L., C. & P.S. 73, 75-76, 81 (1951).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Tramaglino, 197 F.2d 928, 932 n.2 (2d Cir. 1952).
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Interrogatories accompanying a general verdict are available for an "ultimate
fact" in issue, such as the accused's sanity when the charged crime was com-
mitted.17 But the "ultimate fact" definition would not seem to include other
crimes mentioned in a case, since these are not elements of the substantive
crime, but rather evidence to prove such elements. Similarly, use of special
verdicts in other crimes cases would seem to be impracticable, for such ver-
dicts must be framed with particular care to avoid reversal on appeal.18
Of course, the possibility of improving these after-the-fact measures is not
to be ignored. But their present inability to control the jury's use of prejudicial
matter indicates that the only effective way to prevent undue jury prejudice
is to prevent jury contact with such evidence. Thus the crucial safeguard is
the trial judge's decision to admit or exclude the evidence when offered.
RULES OF ADmISSIBILITY
The Prosecutor's Case-in-Chief
When other crimes evidence is presented directly to the judge for a ruling
on admissibility, he can apply fairly well formulated rules which are designed
to strike the balance between prejudice and probity.' 9 All jurisdictions observe
the requirement that no evidence may be admitted which tends solely to prove
that the accused has a "criminal disposition."20 The rationale for this absolute
prohibition is that such evidence is always more prejudicial than probative. -
Most states attempt to bar disposition evidence by excluding all other crimes
evidence unless relevant to a limited number of facts and propositions.2 2 In
17. See, e.g., State v. Tugas, 37 Wash. 2d 236, 222 P.2d 817 (1950) ; Comment, 60
CoLU m. L. :Rv. 999 & n.6 (1960). Since jury proceedings are secret and the general ver-
dict requires no finding but guilt or innocence, the jury's deliberative process in almost
every criminal trial is effectively unguided. Interrogatories, which may check jury think-
ing on important issues, are disfavored and rarely used in criminal trials, see, e.g., Gray
v. United States, 174 F.2d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 848 (1949) ; State
v. Greater Huntington Theatre Corp., 133 W. Va. 252, 260-61, 55 S.E.2d 681, 686 (1949),
although in some jurisdictions the trial judge has discretion to use them, e.g., State v.
Harold, 45 Wash. 2d 505, 509, 275 P.2d 895, 897 (1949). If proper under the "ultimate
fact" rubric, see text immediately infra, interrogatories could question the jurors on
vwhether the prosecution had met its required proof burden on any other crime-in Texas,
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt," e.g., Nami v. State, 127 Tex. Cr. R. 403, 77 S.W.2d
528 (1934), in all other jurisdictions, "substantial evidence" or a near equivalent, e.g.,
People v. Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d 550, 579-80, 145 P.2d 21, 22 (1944)-before such crime
could be applied as proof of the crime charged. But some defendants might not want to
focus the jury's attention on the other crime. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
18. See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 353-54 (1930) ; Driver, A More Extended Use of
the Special Verdict, 9 F.R.D. 495, 499 (1950).
19. The trial judge's role is that of a "preliminary tester" of the evidence. 1 WIGMORE
§ 29; see Trautman, supra note 1, at 387; MCCORMICK § 53, at 123.
20. See McCoRmIcK § 157, at 327 & n.2 (collecting authorities). This ban is an appli-
cation of the rule that the prosecution may not introduce bad character evidence initially.
Ibid.
21. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
22. This is the prevailing rule in America. See Note, 3 VAND. L. REv. 779 (1950);
Slough & Knightly, supra note 1, at 327. The leading case is People v. Molineux, 168
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these states, other crimes evidence will be admitted only if relevant to prove
such things as res gestae, common scheme or plan, unusual and distinctive
method, identity, passion for illicit sexual relations with the accuser, scienter,
motive, specific intent, or purpose to avoid punishment.2 This list covers most
of the recognized exceptions to the "exclusionary" rule. But the purposes for
which evidence may be admitted vary from state to state, depending upon
local statute or common law.24 The federal courts and a small but growing
number of states do not impose this exclusionary requirement; these juris-
dictions have adopted an "inclusionary" rule under which they admit all other
crimes evidence relevant to an issue in the trial, except that which tends to
prove only criminal disposition.2 5 Some courts using the language of "ex-
clusion" admit of so many acceptable uses of other crimes evidence that, in
practical fact, the standard applied is as liberal as that articulated by "in-
clusionary" courts.2 6 The "exclusionary" and "inclusionary" systems aim at
the same goal-keeping from the jury disposition or character evidence-but
the difference in approach may have significant effects at trial.
In many exclusionary jurisdictions, the list of permissible uses for other
crimes evidence has become crystallized through codification 2 7 or stare de-
cisis)2 8 and some courts have rigidly adhered to a particular list of categories.2 9
N.Y. 264, 291-94, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (1901).
23. Another exception is use for impeachment, but this use involves somewhat dif-
ferent considerations. See text at notes 68-91 infra. A relatively full list is found in McCoR-
micK § 157, but he is careful to say it is not complete, and that some evidence may fall
between categories or into more than one. Id. at 327-28. Compare the closed formulation
in People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 291-94, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (1901).
24. Recognized exceptions are normally a product of spontaneous judicial thought and
research. See Slough & Knightly, supra note 1, at 326.
25. See MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON EVIDENCE 380 (1957); e.g., Al-
ford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W.2d 804 (1954) ; Swann v. United States, 195 F.2d
689 (4th Cir. 1952) ; People v. Woods, 35 Cal. 2d 504, 218 P.2d 981 (1950) ; State v. Scott,
111 Utah 9, 21-22, 175 P.2d 1016, 1022 (1947). The distinction between exclusionary and
inclusionary approaches is frequently blurred by the reference to recognized exclusionary
exceptions as proof that the evidence is relevant.
England apparently uses the inclusionary rule today, largely on the authority of Malin
v. Attorney-General for New South Wales, [1894] A.C. 57 (P.C. 1893) ; see Stone I, supra
note 1, at 961-78. But cf. Carter, The Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Facts: I & II,
69 L.Q. Rsv. 80 (1953), 70 L.Q. Rsv. 214 (1954). For a recent updating of the English
cases, see MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, Op. Cit. supra.
26. See the comment in State v. Scott, 111 Utah at 20-22, 175 P.2d at 1022.
27. See MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1050 (1954); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.58
(1953) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:445, 15:446 (1951) (admitted only to show intent
and knowledge). Pennsylvania's statute which was held not to apply to other crimes evi-
dence offered on the case-in-chief, Commonwealth v. Darcy, 362 Pa. 259, 283, 66 A.2d 663,
675, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 862 (1949), was overturned for vagueness in Commonwealth
v. De Pofi, 362 Pa. 229, 66 A.2d 649 (1949).
28. See Stone II, supra note 1, at 1020-21.
29. E.g., State v. Vance, 119 Iowa 685, 687, 94 N.W. 204-05 (1903) ; People v. Moli-
neux, 168 N.Y. 264, 291-93, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (1901) ; People v. Dales, 309 N.Y. 97, 101,
127 N.E2d 829, 831 (1955) ; Nester v. State, 334 P.2d 524, 527-32 (Nev. 1959) (full dis-
cussion).
19611
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Courts following this approach may explain the exclusion of evidence relevant
to issues outside the accepted list on the ground that evidence thus excluded
is by nature more prejudicial than probative.30 The apparent premise of this
explanation seems to be that the prejudicial content of other crimes evidence
is more or less uniform, making relevancy the determinative factor in deciding
admissibility. The categories are probably looked to as a predetermined index
of the kinds of evidence important enough to overcome prejudicial content.
This attitude encourages automatic application of the rule, without individual
analysis of probity or prejudicial content.
Both underlying assumptions seem erroneous. To the extent that permissible
uses are not expanded when new evidentiary relationships are encountered,
the list of permissible uses becomes an inaccurate index of relevancy.31 It is
more likely to be a somewhat arbitrary collection of historically accepted
rules.32 Moreover, the very use of general rules in this area is inappropriate.
Evidence having some relevance to the issue of intent, for example, may or
may not prejudice the jury unduly depending on the nature of the crime. Rigid
application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances is likely to produce
two errors. Probative evidence which is not unduly prejudicial may be ex-
cluded because it fails to qualify for one of the jurisdiction's accepted pur-
poses. 33 Similary, evidence relevant to some accepted purpose may be admitted
without regard to its prejudicial content.34 At the other extreme, adherence
to existing categories may cause judges desiring to admit certain "nonconform-
ing" evidence to distort one of those categories.35 While this practice may
30. See, e.g., the statements in Quarles v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.2d 947, 948-49
(Ky. 1951).
31. Careful commentators recognize their "lists" are not exhaustive. See, e.g., Mc-
CORTMICK § 157, at 327-28.
"[l]t is difficult to determine which is the more extensive, the doctrine or the acknowl-
edged exceptions." Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 862, 870 (1878).
32. The exceptions used by American courts were taken bodily from the English
cases. See Stone II, supra note 1, at 991-93. For a sketch of the process of accretion, see
Stone I, supra note 1, at 958-73. After about 1850 the list was crystallized in England.
Id. at 965-78.
33. E.g., People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901). Evidence tending to
prove the accused had poisoned another victim in the same unusual way as in the crime
charged was excluded as not within recognized categories of motive, intent, absence of
mistake or accident, common scheme or plan, and identity. For criticism of the Molineux
decision, see Stone II, supra note 1, at 1023-30. See also Regina v. Hall, 5 N.Z.L.R.
(C.A.) 93, 110 (1887).
34. See, e.g., Falla v. State, 61 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1952) ; Sparks v. State, 94 Okla.
Crim. App. 416, 237 P.2d 159 (1951); Baher v. United States, 227 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.
1955) ; State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 P.2d 756 (1953), cert. denied sub nom. Neal v.
Graham, 348 U.S. 982 (1955). See also Lacy, supra note 1, at 272 (criticizing method
most courts use for deciding admissibility as mechanical application of rote rules).
35. A discussion of this process in relation to the charged crime of rape is found in
Lacy, supra note 1, at 272-81. See also Note, 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 485 (1948) ; Note,
10 MOD. L. REv. 193 (1947) ; Stone II, supra note 1, at 1031.
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introduce flexibility by the back door, attention to the formulae of existing
categories will impede proper analysis of the actual probity and prejudicial
content of the evidence offered. It may also facilitate introduction of prejudicial
evidence by generally broadening the definition of those kinds of evidence
which the rule affirmatively declares admissible.
It seems preferable, therefore, to adopt the inclusionary rule's flexible at-
titude toward relevancy of other crimes evidence. This alone, however, will
not result in an accurate evaluation of the evidence offered. Concentration on
relevance alone ignores the varying degrees of prejudicial content which may
be involved, and may lead courts following either approach to conclude that
all relevant other crimes evidence is per se admissible.3 6 Courts should ex-
plicitly evaluate the prejudicial impact of relevant other crimes evidence.
Some courts have explicitly recognized this obligation by adopting what has
been called a "balancing test."'37 Under this test evidence found relevant to
some issue at trial is not necessarily admissible. The court first must weigh the
probative worth of this information against its tendency to prejudice the jury.
If the potentiality of bias overbalances the contribution to the rational develop-
ment of the case, the evidence will be barred.3 8
Whichever form of the rule is followed, the "balancing test" becomes the
chief barrier against the use of prejudicial other crimes evidence. The state-
ment of this test gives it an attractive simplicity: "probative worth" is weighed
against "tendency to prejudice." Difficulties of application may be swept under
the carpet of "discretion" found in all good trial courts. Unfortunately, the
trial judge must be armed with more than discretion and a formula to apply
the test correctly.
Probative worth is a complicated notion. Because other crimes evidence is
generally circumstantial, its use demands an inference from the fact of the
"other crime" to the fact or proposition in issue. Thus, if evidence of a prior
conviction for a crime requiring scienter-for example, knowing possession
of stolen goods-is introduced to show knowledge in a second trial for a like
offense, the judge must examine the reasonableness of the inference which
the prosecution wants drawn from this evidence: that one conviction for this
type of offense makes inadvertent possession of stolen goods less likely.3 9 But
the difficulties involved in analyzing this inference are complicated by the
nature of much other crimes evidence. A prior conviction 40 or plea of guilty 41
36. See the earlier cases espousing this view collected in 1 WIGmORE § 216, at 714-15;
cf. State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 20-22, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021-22 (1947).
37. See, e.g., State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 379, 218 P.2d 300, 306 (1950) (evidence
should be excluded "where the minute peg of relevancy will be entirely obscured by the
dirty linen hung upon it").
38. See generally McCoRmicK § 157, at 332-33.
39. See authorities cited note 10 supra.
40. Even here, the certainty is not absolute. See BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNO-
CENT (1932).
41. See Piassick v. United States, 253 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1958); Commonwealth v.
Sciullo, 169 Pa. Super. 318, 82 A.2d 695 (1951).
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establishes the commission of the other crime with a high degree of certainty.
Often, however, other crimes evidence may include acquittals for technical
reasons,42 arrests which did not lead to trial,43 police observations not culminat-
ing in arrest,44 and police or private suspicions often not based on direct
observation.4 5 In such cases, the judge must make a double evaluation of its
probative worth, tracing the inference from the testimony to the commission
of the other crime, and then to the fact in issue. In some instances, a still longer
string of inferences may be required. 46
Thus far, the scrutiny is that accorded all types of circumstantial evidence.
"Probative worth," however, consists of more than logical relevance or persua-
siveness. No matter how persuasive of the fact it is supposed to prove, other
crimes evidence has no probative worth if the fact is not in issue. Perhaps
the clearest case would be other crimes evidence offered to prove a fact not
material to proof of the charged crime-for example, specific intent in a man-
slaughter trial. Because such evidence does not advance the search for truth, it
serves no purpose which might justify whatever prejudice it creates, and is
excluded for that reason.47 A similar situation would exist when the accused
concedes the issue to be proved-for example, when he admits committing the
act in question and bases his defense on some other grounds. 48 Courts have
applied this principle to forbid the introduction of evidence on issues which
42. See Alford v. Territory of Hawaii, 205 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1953) (statute of limita-
tions).
43. See State v. Carroll, 188 S.W2d 22 (Mo. Super. 1945) ; State v. Jacobs, 195 La.
281, 196 So. 347 (1940) ; State v. Woodring, 37 Wash. 2d 281, 223 P.2d 459 (1950).
44. See People v. Kozakis, 102 Cal. App. 2d 662, 228 P.2d 58 (1951) ; People v. Don-
aldson, 130 Cal. App. 2d 250, 278 P2d 739 (1955); Lypp v. United States, 159 F.2d 353
(6th Cir. 1947).
45. See Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687
(1941) ; People v. Knight, 62 Cal. App. 143, 216 Pac. 96 (1923).
46. See, e.g., People v. Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d 550, 145 P.2d 7 (1944) ; Lacy, sipra
note 1, at 282-83. On the difficulties for both judge and counsel in dealing with a long
string of "connecting up" evidence, see McCoRmIcK § 58.
The shibboleth that there may be "no inference on an inference" is put to rest in nearly
all cases and by the commentators. See Lacy, mepra note 1, at 281-86 (suggesting that the
weakness of a link, rather than the length of the chain, operates to keep out a chain of
evidentiary facts) ; Regina v. Onufrejczyk, [1955] 1 All E.R. 247.
47. See State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 103 Atl. 649 (1918), citing People v. Moli-
neux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901). See also State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 218
P.2d 300, 301-06 (1950); People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 195, 172 N.E. 466, 467
(1930) ; United States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 1948) ; cf. Shepard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933) (hearsay declaration excluded). These cases make clear that
the prosecutor may not claim one ground for admission at trial, and then switch his theory
on appeal, finding the former ground inadequate. E.g., State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367,
378, 218 P.2d 300, 306 (1950). England also adopts the necessity position. See Noor Mo-
hamed v. The King, [1949] A.C. 182, 190-96; cf. Thompson v. The King, [1918] A.C.
221, 232.




seem impossible to dispute, and which are in fact not contested.4 9 Gilligan v.
State,0 the leading case, held that other crimes evidence of intent could not be
admitted where the act in question, poisoning, was unequivocally intentional.5 '
The court noted, however, that the prosecution could use such evidence in re-
buttal if the defendant specifically put intent in issue by claiming that the
poisoning was accidental,5 2 and most authorities agree with this qualification.5 3
Courts refer to this element of probative worth as the "necessity" of the
evidence. The cases recognizing the necessity factor seem limited to those in
which there is no dispute about the issue to be proved other than that tech-
nically raised by a general denial.54 It might be argued, however, that the prin-
ciple of necessity should also be applicable to disputed issues when the prose-
cution's other evidence on the issue is sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt.
Here it seems equally true that the only meaningful effect of other crimes evi-
dence would be to prejudice the jury against the accusedY5
Admittedly, exclusion of evidence in this case would require a premature
decision on the factual issue which would interfere with the jury's ability to
make a decision. But this is also true of the recognized practice of excluding
"intent" evidence in cases involving "unequivocally intentional" crimes. While
the defendant's disputation of the issue makes the judge's conclusion less
certain, this fact changes only the degree and not the kind of the judicial
interference. Perhaps another objection to expanding the necessity test to
contested issues is the notion that the defendant "waives" his protection against
other crimes evidence by disputing the issue." Whatever the merits of this
"opened door" rubric to prevent a defendant from abusing an evidentiary
49. A clear statement of this is found in the English case of Thompson v. The King,
[1918] A.C. 221, 232: "The mere theory that a plea of not guilty puts everything material
in issue is not enough for this purpose [of substantively 'raising an issue' on which other
crimes evidence may be introduced]. The prosecution cannot credit the accused with fancy
defenses in order to rebut them at the outset with some damning piece of prejudice."
50. 92 Conn. 526, 103 Atl. 649 (1918).
51. Id. at 532, 103 Ati. at 652. Compare People v. Knight, 62 Cal. App. 143, 216 Pac.
96 (1923) (other crimes evidence admissible when defendant admits act and pleads acci-
dent). Contra State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 136 S.W. 316 (1911).
52. 92 Conn. at 532-33, 103 Atl. at 653.
53. See generally McCoRMICK § 157, at 331.
54. See, e.g., the Gilligan court's statement that the act was "not equivocal, and so
the only practical effect which the evidence could have would be to prejudice the accused
.... " 92 Conn. at 536, 103 Atl. at 653. One indication of the certainty required is the
qualification that the evidence will be admissible simply if defendant raises the issue.
55. See State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. at 536, 103 Atl. at 653. Although in Gilligan there
was no defense on the issue of intent, see note 54 supra, the court speaks in terms of proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt" on the issue, indicating that, even if defendant claimed acci-
dent, but the state's direct proof was overwhelming, evidence of other poisonings would
be ecluded. Cf. A. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Crim-
inal Procedure, 69 YA.E L.J. 1149-63, 1199 (1960).
56. See People v. Knight, 62 Cal. App. 143, 216 Pac, 96 (1923) (defenlant "opened
the door" by denying intent).
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privilege, it loses this justification when its use is not necessary to protect
the state's case. Applied when defendant has clearly lost the issue, the "open
door" notion serves only to punish defendants who contest. Thus, in deter-
mining probative worth, the court should evaluate the prosecution's other
admitted and admissible evidence to determine whether the offered other
crimes evidence is necessary to prove the issue beyond a reasonable doubtP 7
This procedure is not without dangers. A court satisfied that other evidence
establishes the issue beyond a reasonable doubt will withhold probative other
crimes evidence from the jury. If the jury disagrees with the court's evaluation
of the other evidence, finding it alone unpersuasive, this suppression may
change the outcome of the trial. There should be a point, however, at which the
prosecutor's need for a safety margin of proof is outweighed by the potentially
prejudicial effect of the evidence offered. Two complex variables-the relative
certainty of other available proof on the issue and the degree of prejudicial
impact of the other crimes evidence---should be considered in arriving at this
decision.58
The "necessity" test leads to the anomalous result that defendants with the
weakest rebuttal evidence on an issue have the strongest shield against other
crimes evidence. 59 But this fact should not obscure its pragmatic importance.
The number of reported cases discussing use of other crimes evidence gives
some indication of the frequency with which such evidence is used.60 Clearly,
prosecutors are aware of the usefulness such evidence has in securing convic-
tions, and the temptations to introduce this evidence in the hope that it will
have a prejudicial effect are undoubtly great.6 The best check against misuse
of this kind of evidence in nonuse. This is particularly true where the other
crimes evidence goes only to one issue while the prejudicial effect is likely to
affect the outcome of the entire case, which may be in doubt. At the very least,
57. A reasonable doubt test for exclusion is the narrowest statement of the necessity
principle; indeed, it is the only standard consistent with this principle. If a lower standard,
such as "substantial evidence" were applied, the judge would exclude other crimes evidence
in situations where the jury, on the basis of evidence admitted, might acquit. However,
the necessity factor should only affect calculation of probative worth when the jury is
reasonably certain to find that the issue is established without other crimes data.
58. Arguably, a simpler approach-and one which would retain some penalty to the
defendant for raising the issue-would be to require the defendant to concede the issue as
a condition of barring the other crimes evidence offered in rebuttal. The impact of such
a concession on the jury, however, may go further than erasing the contested issue.
59. Cf. 1 WIGMORE § 216. Not only is the defendant with the weakest case protected;
the prosecutor who makes the least effort to secure evidence directly related to a material
issue has the best chance to get information of prior crimes admitted. This result directly
undermines the rationale of the necessity doctrine.
60. Cases involving the trial use of other crimes evidence are as plentiful "as the
sands of the sea." McCoRMICK § 157, at 327 n.2.
61. See Ladd, supra note 1, at 190 ("[T]he bypath of previous convictions for the
purpose of testing credibility is something never missed by the prosecuting attorney.");
Lacy, supra note 1, at 286. Note, 54 COLUM. L. Rv. 946, 948 (1954).
Compare HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTIcE IN ENGLAND 403 (1931).
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therefore, the prosecutor should be required to offer all more direct and less
volatile data before he relies on other crimes information. The "necessity"
rule, if applied to all evidence at the prosecutor's command, will tend to insure
this result.
Prejudice
The prejudicial impact of other crimes evidence is a function of jury
reactions to that evidence. A judge evaluating such evidence should attempt
to predict the reactions of the actual jury sitting before him, considering the
individual characteristics he has discovered though juror examination and the
various local prejudices of which he is aware as a member of the community.
There is no necessary correlation between prejudicial impact and probative
worth. Prior sexual offenses and other heinous crimes can be extremely
damning, even though their logical relation to the crime charged may be
tenuous. 2 The less substantial the probative worth in these cases, the less
difficult the task of balancing. Often, however, similarity between the other
crime and the crime charged will tend to increase both the jury's bias against
the accused and the probative worth of the evidence. 63 Even if the jury is
no more disposed to punish the accused for his unpunished past crimes,
"overpersuasion" may lead them to conclude that, having committed a crime
of the type charged, he is likely to repeat it. When the two competing values
are linked, striking a balance will often require that the judge consider other
factors relating to the progress of the trial as a whole.
The judge's decision will be most difficult when he concludes that the pre-
judicial impact of the evidence is so great that the jury is certain to convict,
regardless of the evidence. The decisive nature of such "outcome determin-
ative" evidence appears to cause some judges to exclude it regardless of its
probative weight. 64 This approach might be supported by the belief that juries
should not be permitted to decide criminal cases on an irrational basis. On
the other hand, where the highly prejudicial evidence also has great probative
worth and plays a crucial role in the prosecutor's case, exclusion of the evi-
dence may destroy his case and result in an unjustified acquittal. 65
62. Perhaps because commentators have pressed for an exception for evidence show-
ing a passionate relationship or inclination to commit sexual offenses, see Stone II, supra
note 1, at 1011-16, there has been increasing acceptance of this purpose. See, e.g., Abbott
v. State, 113 Neb. 517, 521, 204 N.W. 74, 75, reversed on other grounds on rehearing,
113 Neb. 524, 206 N.W. 153 (1925) ("sexual depravity") ; People v. Gasser, 34 Cal. App.
541, 544, 168 Pac. 157, 158 (1917) ("lewd and lascivious disposition and tendency to com-
mit lewd and lascivious acts"). The relevance of such evidence as an index of propensity
has been seriously questioned. See Slough & Knightly, supra note 1, at 332-36. The con-
flicting authorities on this problem are collected at Trautman, supra note 1, at 406 & nn.
83, 84.
63. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
64. See, e.g., Noor Mohamed v. The King, [1949] A.C. 182.
65. Compare Noor Mohamed v. The King, supra note 64, with Note, 12 MOD. L. REv.
232 (1949). Compare People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E.2d 286 (1901), with
Stone II, supra note 1, at 1023-30.
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The problem with "outcome determinative' evidence is that either ruling by
the judge is likely to preclude a rational decision by the jury. The judge's
decision must always result in either damning prejudice or a deceptive lack
of evidence. It is impossible, therefore, to observe the traditional division of
function between judge and jury, and a judge ruling on the admissibility of
such evidence cannot escape the obligation to decide the case himself."0 In
ruling, the judge should evaluate all the evidence, including the rational
inference from the other crimes evidence, to determine whether guilt is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the court is persuaded that all the evidence establishes guilt, it should
admit the other crimes evidence. Conversely, if all evidence including that of
other crimes is, in the court's view, insufficient to warrant a conviction, the
evidence should be barred even though it is itself quite persuasive. A third pos-
sible situation should be distinguished. The judge may find that, even without
the other crimes evidence, the prosecution's case establishes guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Within such a finding is the narrower conclusion that the
particular fact to be proved by the other crimes evidence has already been es-
tablished. Thus the "necessity" test becomes relevant, and should take pre-
cedence over the inquiry into the larger issue of guilt. The "outcome deter-
minative" inquiry is applicable only when, in addition to its extremely preju-
dicial content, the other crimes evidence is "necessary" to prove a fact essen-
tial to the prosecution's case.6 7
Cross Examination I: Impeachment of the Defendant
Cross examination of the accused affords additional opportunities for the
66. The traditional rubric is that the jury finds the facts, the judge the law; see Gold-
stein, supra note 55, at 1155. But since judges began, about a century ago, to pass on the
sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases, they have had the power to direct a verdict
of acquittal if the prosecutor failed to prove his case. Goldstein, supra note 55, at 1157-59
& nn.22, 23; see, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 218 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; People v.
Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953) (motion to dismiss). See generally Note, 55
CoLUm. L. REv. 549 (1955) ; Note, 49 YALE L.J. 733 (1940). A growing number of juris-
dictions, however, have reduced the power to direct acquittal by allowing the case to go to
the jury if there has been "substantial evidence" of every material allegation. See Gold-
stein, supra note 55, at 1152-62.
Courts are not, however, allowed to direct verdicts of guilty. Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51, 105 (1895) ; Fleischman v. United States, 174 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
Even the isolated cases allowing such a procedure where there is no contradiction to a
clear showing of guilt, see Yates v. State, 31 Ala. App. 362, 17 So. 2d 776, cert. denied,
245 Ala. 490, 17 So. 2d 777 (1944), are contrary to the almost universal rule.
67. It might be, of course, that the judge, if called upon to decide the case, might find
the defendant guilty, and yet not feel that the evidence on this issue was so certain that
the additional other crimes evidence was "unnecessary." In this case, the hypothesized
extremely prejudicial content of the evidence should be weighed against its value to the




introduction of other crimes evidence. 6s In most jurisdictions, if the accused
takes the stand, evidence of past convictions and alleged criminal acts may
be introduced immediately to impeach his credibility. Statutes in many juris-
dictions governing the impeachment of the credibility of witnesses (including
the accused) authorize the introduction of a wide range of criminal convictions
on the issue of credibility ;69 in many jurisdictions, moreover, allegations of
criminal acts may be introduced for this purpose.70 As to convictions,
some states admit "any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude,"
others "any crime" or "any felony," while a few admit "infamous crimes,"
the common law test. Some states leave the decision on relevancy to the
trial judge's discretion.71 Whatever the range of permissible crimes, the
standards apply regardless of the content of the accused's testimony. Comment-
ators have severely criticized the breadth of these standards, 72 and the authors
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence echo this criticism by strictly limiting the
other crimes evidence available for impeachment purposes to convictions for
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.73 Moreover, under the Uniform
Rules, other crimes evidence is only admissible if the accused has "first intro-
duced evidence admissible solely for the purpose of supporting his credibil-
ity."'7 4 The "dishonesty and false statement" standard of the Uniform Rules
is followed generally in the federal system and in a small but growing number
of states."5 But, expect for an abortive attempt by Pennsylvania,76 no juris-
diction has yet adopted the requirement that the defendant must have specifical-
ly placed his credibility in issue.
68. See generally Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166
(1941) ; MCCORMICK §§ 42, 43.
69. See MCCORMCK § 93. Most jurisdictions seem to make no differentiation, for pur-
poses of impeachment, between the accused and other witnesses. This is difficult to recon-
cile with the far greater danger of prejudice to the accused's chances from evidence of his
own past acts. See id. § 43, at 93-94.
70. See MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON EvIDENcE 297-98 (1957) ; Mc-
CORMICK § 42, at 88 & nn.10-15 (listing exceptions).
71. See McCoRiscK § 43, at 89-91 & nn.2-10 (collecting the various formulae).
72. See Ladd, supra note 68, at 177-83; MCCORMICK § 43, at 91.
73. UNIFoRm RULE OF EVIDENCE 21.
The "dishonesty and false statement" standard is apparently wider than that of crimen
jalsi-perjury, subordination of perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery, conspiracy
to procure absence of witnesses, barratry, and forgery, see Ladd, supra note 68, at 179,
since it includes uttering forged instruments, bribery, suppression of evidence, false pre-
tenses, cheating and embezzlement. Id. at 180-82.
74. UNIFORm RuLEs OF EVMENCE 21.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Haynes, 81 F. Supp. 63, 68 (W.D. Pa. 1948), aff'd, 173
F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1949); United States v. Katz, 78 F. Supp. 435, 439 (M.D. Pa. 1948),
aff'd, 173 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1949). But see Christianson v. United States, 226 F.2d 646,
655 (8th Cir. 1955). See also Commonwealth v. Waychoff, 177 Pa. Super. 182, 186, 110
A.2d 780, 781-82 (1958) ; Hunter v. State, 193 Md. 596, 605, 69 A.2d 505, 509 (1949).
76. See Act of July 3, 1947, Penn. Laws 1239 (amending Act of March 15, 1911, PA.
STAT. ANm. tit. 19, § 711), held unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. De Pofi, 362 Pa.
229, 66 A.2d 649 (1949).
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Admission of a broad range of other crimes evidence for impeachment pur-
poses permits the use of evidence relevant only to an accused's moral charac-
ter, and thus conflicts with the rationale underlying the general bar on pure
disposition evidence. The premise of the broad impeachment rules seems to
be that a person's general character can be determined by evidence of past
criminal acts and that general character can be a meaningful index of pro-
pensity to lie. That some jurisdictions have narrowed the permissible class
of offenses to crimes involving "moral turpitude" serves only to underscore this
premise.77 And even the most restrictive jurisdictions, which have adopted a
version of the Uniform Rules standard, admit what may be called "specific
disposition" evidence. The rationale underlying the limitation of admissible
evidence to crimes involving "dishonesty and false statement" is that only
these crimes indicate a disposition to perjury.78 Thus, even in these jurisdic-
tions, the rule reflects a clear distinction between the principles governing
the prosecutor's main case, where disposition evidence is absolutely barred,
and those controlling the use of evidence for impeachment purposes.79
In practice, the possibility of "opening the door" to prejudicial other crimes
evidence discourages many defendants from taking the stand. 0 The impeach-
ment doctrine thus effects an anomalous distinction between defendants with
and those without a criminal record in the exercise of the right to testify in
their own behalf.
Most jurisdictions place some procedural limitations on the use of other
crimes evidence to impeach. Courts do not allow an unrestricted exploration
by the prosecutor into past convictions or alleged past crimes.8' The scope
and intensity of the prosecutor's inquiry may be regulated at the discretion
of the trial judge.8 2 Thus, if a prosecutor has badgered the accused or re-
peatedly asked him the same question about a past act, he may be silenced
or told to move to other matters.8 3 Similarly, aggravating background cir-
cumstances of a conviction usually may not be inquired into; only the type
of crime, time and place of conviction, and punishment imposed may be shown
by the prosecutor when proving a former conviction.84 A final safeguard for
77. See Chandler, Attacking Credibility of Witnesses by Proof of Charge or Convic-
tion of Crime, 10 TEXAS L. Bxv. 257, 283-85 (1932) (discussing the Texas "moral turpi-
tude" rule).
78. See Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 272, 145 Atl. 89, 92 (1928) ; Ladd,
supra note 68, at 177-83; McCoRMcIC § 43, at 91.
79. The distinction is probably an historical outgrowth of the early common law dis-
qualification of witnesses convicted of certain crimes. See McCoRmIcK § 43, at 89-90.
80. See id. at 93-94.
81. See id. at 92-93.
82. See id. § 42, § 43 at 92-93; Ladd, supra note 68, at 178-82.
83. See, e.g., State v. Haffa, 246 Iowa 1275, 1285, 71 N.W,2d 35, 41 (1955) (dictum).
But the extent of cross examination is at the discretion of the trial court. E.g., People v.
Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950). Although occasionally a trial court may be
reversed for allowing a prosecutor to persist, see State v. Hild, 240 Iowa 1119, 1155, 39
N.W.2d 139, 159 (1949), such reversals are rare.
84. See MCCORMICk: § 43, at 92-93.
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alleged other crimes, erected as much for convenience as to bar prejudice,
is the requirement that the prosecutor must "take the answer" of the accused,
and not introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict his answer. This limitation
does not apply to denials of a prior conviction, which can be proved without
delay and distraction of the jury's attention. s5 A final attempt to minimize
prejudice, used in a substantial number of jurisdictions including the federal
courts, is to allow the accused, absolutely or in the trial judge's discretion,
to make a "brief and general statement" in denial or extenuation of his guilt
on the crime for which he was convicted.8 6 These standards, however, do not
protect against the bedrock of undue bias created by the introduction of other
convictions which, while highly prejudicial in themselves, have slight proba-
tive value.
One factor which may have led to the permissive use of other crimes evi-
dence in this area is a belief in the jury's ability to segregate the evidence
according to its permissible uses. Courts admitting other crimes evidence for
credibility purposes instruct juries to limit consideration of this evidence to
the issue of credibility.87 As some courts have recognized, 88 these instructions
are frequently if not always fruitless. Recent jury examinations conducted
by the University of Chicago indicate that jurors do not segregate evidence
introduced for impeachment purposes. These tests disclosed that jurors have an
almost universal inability and/or unwillingness either to understand or
follow the court's instruction on the use of defendant's prior criminal
record for impeachment purposes. The jurors almost universally used
defendant's record to conclude that he was a bad man and hence was
more likely than not guilty of the crime for which he was then standing
trial.89
85. See id. § 42, at 89, § 43, at 92.
86. United States v. Boyer, 150 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1945), is the leading case for
allowing such a statement, which Wigmore approves as a "harmless charity," 4 WIGMoRE
§ 1117, at 191, and McCormick as a "reasonable outlet for the instinct of self-defense for
one attacked," McCoRIIcK § 43, at 93.
87. See Kemp v. Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1948) ; Matters v. Commonwealth,
245 S.W.2d 913 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952). But cf. Galbert v. State, 278 P.2d 245 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1954).
88. See Stephens v. State, 252 Ala. 183, 186, 40 So. 2d 90, 93 (1949) ; State v. Van
Williams, 212 S.C. 110, 46 S.E.2d 665 (1948); State v. Lindsey, 27 Wash. 2d 186, 177
P.2d 387, aff'd on rehearing, 27 Wash. 2d 193, 181 P.2d 830 (1947).
89. Letter From Dale W. Broeder, Associate Professor, the University of Nebraska
College of Law, who conducted -intensive jury interviews, to Yale Law Journal, dated
March 14, 1960, on file in Yale Law Library. See also Letter From Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Professor, the University of Chicago Law School, who also conducted the interviews,
dated March 7, 1960, on file in Yale Law Library (Our data "suggest that the jury, like
everybody else, has enormous difficulty in understanding what it means to use the evidence
on impeachment only and not on guilt.") As Professor Kalven's letter indicates, this ma-
terial has not yet been published, in part because of the privacy problem about disclosing
the identities of jurors interviewed.
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The effort of courts and reformers to limit the use of other crimes evidence
for impeachment, both by procedural limitations and by confining the category
of offense admissible, is tacit recognition of the danger that impeachment
evidence will circumvent the purpose of the rules governing admissibility of
direct evidence. Whether these limitations cure the abuse, however, is ques-
tionable. Perhaps the most illogical protective device is the jury instruction
to use the evidence only in weighing credibility. Observers conclude the order
is not obeyed, and a moment's reflection about thought processes raises doubts
as to whether it can be obeyed. Yet use of the instruction continues, smoothing
over the real question of whether uncontrolled use of such evidence ought
to be allowed. More radical limitations suffer the same inconsistency. The
Uniforms Rules' exclusion of all crimes but crimes of deceit has a superficial
plausibility, for it admits into evidence only those crimes from which some
direct inference about lying can be drawn. But the difference in probity be-
tween crimes of "dishonesty and false statement" and other crimes seems
minimal. At best, convictions for forgery, embezzlement, and even perjury,
do no more than negative the possible assumption of some jurors that the
particular witness could ,not lie with a straight face. A record of crimes of
deceit does not tell any more about the accused's willingness to lie when faced
with punishment than does a record containing other kinds of crimes.90 The
possibility that crimes of deceit may be slightly more probative of a general
propensity to lie seems irrelevant, for it would appear that, under the pressures
of trial and facing a conviction, most guilty defendants will acquire such
"propensities" quite readily. Therefore, if other types of crimes are considered
inadmissible because their prejudicial effect outweighs their probity, the slight
added relevancy of the "lying" crimes does not seem to justify their exception
from this general ban.
Of course, all of these restrictions serve a protective function in so far as
they reduce the chance that a criminal record will be inadmissible, and limit
some of the abuses which might occur when such evidence gains admission.
But protection is haphazard, particularly that of the Uniform Rules' limita-
tion as to crime of deceit. Rather than spinning out tenuous distinctions
between kinds of other crimes evidence, those concerned with the dangers
of prejudice should direct their attention to the basic question whether,
on balance, the impeachment value of any other crimes evidence is worth
the risk of prejudice it creates.
The balance point may shift, however, when the defendant chooses to in-
troduce evidence of his own credibility or good character. 91
90. See Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IowA L. \Ev. 498,
532-35 (1939).
91. This distinction is observed by UNIFORm RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 21 as to credibility.




Cross Examination I1: Impeachment of Defense Character Witness
The questions the prosecutor is almost universally permitted to ask defense
witnesses who have testified to the accused's good character may also subvert
the rules barring disposition evidence. 92 The barrier against initial prosecution
use of character evidence does not apply to the accused, who may introduce
witnesses who will testify to his good character. This testimony is limited,
however, to statements that the accused has a good reputation, or in a few
jurisdictions, to the witness's personal opinion of him;93 testimony about
specific acts evidencing his good character is excluded on the grounds that
their introduction would be unduly confusing.94 In most jurisdictions, the testi-
mony of good character is limited to traits involved in the crime on trial.9 5
Once the accused has raised the issue of character, the prosecutor may call
witnesses to rebut, by testimony of the defendant's bad reputation. Usually, the
prosecutor may also cross examine defense character witnesses by asking ques-
tions about rumors as to specific acts of the defendant. 6 Thus the prosecutor
may ask the defense witness whether he has heard rumors that defendant was
arrested or convicted for other crimes.9 7 The rationale given for allowing such
questions is that, if answered affirmatively, they might cast serious doubt on
the witness's testimony, thus serving a legitimate rebuttal function, and that,
if answered negatively, they would show that the witness did not know enough
about the accused's reputation to testify.98 In reality the prosecutor frequently
is unconcerned with the witness's answer; his main concern is to get the in-
formation of other crimes before the jury.99
Since this privilege is denied the prosecution in presenting its case-in-chief,
on the grounds that character evidence is not a sufficiently probative index of
92. On impeachment of defense character witnesses, see Ladd, Techniques and Theory
of Character Testimony, 24 IowA L. REv. 493 (1939); McCoRmicK §§ 42-44; 3 WGMoE
§988.
93. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). See generally
McCoaancK § 158. Such testimony is introduced to show "that the general estimate of his
character is so favorable that the jury may infer that he would not be likely to commit
the offense charged." 335 U.S. at 476. Sometimes this testimony alone raises a reasonable
doubt of guilt, and precludes conviction. See Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361
(1896).
94. See People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 418, 82 N.E. 718 (1907), approved
in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478 (1948).
95. See McCoRMIcK § 158, at 334.
96. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479 (1948). These witnesses, or
any other witnesses at trial, may also be impeached by evidence of their. reputation for
truthfulness, on their past convictions or alleged other crimes. See McCoRMIcK §§ 42-44.
97. See generally Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1504-14 (1931).
98. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
99. See 3 WIGMORE § 988: "This method of inquiry or cross-examination is frequent-
ly resorted to by counsel for the very purpose of injuring by indirection a character which
they are forbidden directly to attack in that way; they rely upon the mere putting of the
question (not caring that it is answered negatively) to convey their covert insinuation."
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guilt, it might be argued that it ought similarly to be barred as a weapon for
defendant. Nevertheless, the privilege exists. It has been described as a means
of reinforcing the presumption of innocence, an advantage given the defendant
on the grounds that evidence of good reputation might "tip the scale" in his
favor.100 It also stems from a policy that first offenders should be treated more
leniently, and consequently that the trial procedure should allow an accused
to display his clean record.'"' But the fact remains that the defendant, by sub-
mitting character evidence, asserts that his general character is relevant to
the issue of guilt and denies the premise of the general rule which bars prose-
cutors from using such evidence. Thus it would be incongruous to deny the
prosecution the opportunity to search for indications of bad character by
way of impeachment. Although not sufficiently probative by normal standards,
the character evidence sought is being used to rebut defense evidence which,
by those same standards, also lacks probity. Despite the prejudicial effects
of such cross-examination, it is justified on the ground that otherwise the
defendant can profit "by a mere parade of partisans."' 0 2 Courts have further
stressed the fact that the defendant has the choice whether or not to initiate
this line of inquiry.10 3
This interpretation of defendant's character evidence privilege suggests
that courts should not weigh the probity and prejudice of this other crimes
evidence according to the concepts of probity applied to the case-in-chief.
It can be argued, therefore, that the three jurisdictions which totally exclude
evidence of rumored specific acts, on grounds of undue prejudice, 10 4 go too
far. This criticism cannot be made, however, against the rule urged by Judge
Frank of the Second Circuit 10 5-- incorrectly termed the "Illinois Rule" 1001
100. The leading case is State v. Sterrett, 68 Iowa 76, 78, 25 N.W. 936, 937 (1885)
("the object of introducing evidence with reference to the character of the accused is to
establish a fact upon which a presumption of innocence may be based"). For the effect of
this advantage, see note 93 .upra.
101. See 1 VIGmORE § 55; McCol IcK § 158, at 335; cf. Cancemi v. People, 16 N.Y.
501, 506-57 (1858).
102. 3 WIGMORE § 988.
103. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479 (1948); State v. Hartung, 239
Iowa 414, 427-28, 30 N.W.2d 491, 498-99 (1948).
104. North Carolina prohibits questions about rumors of specific acts, although it does
allow inquiries about reputation for specific vices. See State v. Robinson, 226 N.C. 94, 36
S.E.2d 655 (1946) ; Note, 2 VAND. L. REv. 479, 480 & n.12 (1949) ; Viliborghi v. State,
45 Ariz. 275, 285, 43 P.2d 210, 215 (1935) ; People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524, 6 N.E.2d 845
(1937).
105. United States v. Michelson, 165 F.2d 732, 735 n.8 (2d Cir. 1948), aff'd without
deciding the issue, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (dictum). Judge Frank's opinion for the court
cited 3 WIGMORE § 988 in support of the proposition that the jury "almost surely cannot
comprehend the judge's limiting instruction," and asked the Supreme Court-to no avail
-to change the controlling rules of evidence in light of the prejudicial impact of the evi-
dence.
106. Scrutiny of the Illinois cases on cross examination of defense character witnesses
indicates that a dictum in People v. Hannon, 381 Ill. 206, 44 N.E.2d 923, 925 (1942),
[Vol. 70: 763
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE
which would limit the prosecution to questions about crimes which are similar
in kind to the crime charged. This limitation seems consonant with the usual
restriction of the character witness's testimony to traits involved in the crime
charged. Similar offenses seem more probative of the accused's disposition
to commit the crime charged.107
One limitation has generally been placed on cross examination by prosecu-
tors: specific acts alluded to must have a basis in fact. To insure this, courts
screen the questions prepared by the prosecutor to ascertain whether the acts
involved therein actually occurred. 0 8 This protection creates an anomaly. To
avoid the tendency to obfuscate the main issue by disputes over irrelevant
facts, defense evidence is limited to testimony of reputation. Rebuttal is simi-
larly limited to the issue of reputation. Thus the only evidence which the
prosecution can introduce to discredit a character witness for the accused
is evidence that the defendant's reputation was not what the witness claimed
it was. Yet courts attempt to control prosecutors, not by requiring proof that
rumors of specific criminal acts were current at one time, but rather that
the underlying fact of arrest is true, or at least that there is substantial evi-
dence of it. The Supreme Court recognized the anomaly of the prerequisite,
but approved it "as calculated in practice to hold the inquiry within decent
bounds." 109
To explain this requirement, it must be recognized that effective cross-ex-
amination of good character testimony requires questions concerning specific
acts. The fact that defendant is limited to testimony of good reputation does
not warrant a similar restriction on the prosecutor's cross examination. Good
reputation evidence is, in essence, testimony that no bad acts of the defendant
are known. The negative can be stated generally, but a positive statement
with sufficient force to rebut must, it seems, contain rumors of specific acts.
Most jurisdictions agree, though they allow rumors of specific acts to be
introduced only on cross examination." 0
But the adverse prejudice created by inferences of specific bad acts is almost
certain to outweigh whatever jury prejudice in favor of the defendant is
giving dissimilarity of the rumored other crime as an additional ground for excluding the
question, is the only basis for the association. Other pertinent Illinois decisions bar any
questions about specific acts. See Note, 40 J. Casm. LAw & CRlm. 58, 60-61 & nn.17-22
(1949).
107. See note 9 supra.
108. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481 & n.18 (1948), attributing to Wig-
more the suggestion of this procedure. See United States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d 435, 443
(7th Cir. 1955) (no showing defendant was arrested, evidence inadmissible) ; Wilson v.
State, 225 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tex. Crim. 1950) (motion for rehearing) ; People v. Young,
25 Cal. App. 2d. 148, 77 P.2d 271 (1938). But cf. McCoRmicK § 158, at 336 n.19 ("actual
reversals on this ground [propounding question in bad faith] are exceedingly rare").
For a full discussion of the screening procedure, see State v. Steensen, 35 N.J. Super.
103, 109, 113 A2d 203, 206 (1955).
109. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481 n.18 (1948).
110. See McCoRMICK § 158, at 337.
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induced by a clean record."' In a battle of half-true claims and accusations,
the defendant will surely be harmed on balance. The rule requiring specific
evidence of rumored crimes seems designed to foreclose the worst possibilities
of abuse. It also tends to insure that the rules regulating character evidence
will not operate harshly against the first offender for whom the privilege
seems to have been created; the defendant need not fear a reprisal of pre-
judicial information unless his record is, in fact, tarnished.
OTHER MEANS OF ADMISSION
Forensic Gymnastics
By diligent use of his forensic skills, the prosecutor may place before the
jury prejudicial evidence of the accused's past criminal acts which he would
be barred from using upon direct application to the judge.112 Unsupported
statements by the prosecutor may carry considerable weight, due to the
tendency of jurors to attach great credibility to statements made by a state
law enforcement officer.113 Choice opportunities for such prosecution tactics
are the opening statement and closing argument to the jury. The prosecutor
may abuse his privilege of opening the proceeding by telling the jury he will
prove more numerous and heinous crimes than are charged. 1 4 If this tactic
is objected to, the prosecutor may still avoid a mistrial by apologizing and
claiming he thought the other crimes evidence would later be rated ad-
missible."15 An initial reference to uncharged other crimes in closing is more
vulnerable to attack, for the opportunity to plead ignorance of future de-
velopments is absent. The general rule regarding summations is that the
prosecutor's comments must be confined to the evidence presented at trial."61
Nevertheless, it is a common excess in summation to attach a stigmatic
111. Cf. id. § 158, at 337 n.26.
112. For discussion of forensic misconduct, see generally Levin & Levy, Persuading
the Jury with Facts Not in Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
139 (1956); Davis, Limitations Upon the Prosecution's Summation to the Jury, 42 J.
CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 73 (1951); Comment, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic
Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 946 (1954) ; Note,
The Permissible Scope of Smmnation, 36 COLUm. L. REv. 931 (1936).
113. See Note, 54 CoLUm. L. REv. 946 (1954).
114. See, e.g., Leonard v. United States, 277 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1960) (opening state-
ment mentions 83 other crimes, with aid of a blackboard chart). In the prosecution of
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell for tax evasion, the prosecutor in his opening state-
ment said that he would prove tax frauds "of far greater magnitude" than those alleged
in the indictment. N.Y. Times, March 10, 1960, p. 1, col. 7.
115. This tactic was tried in the Leonard case, supra note 114; it failed.
116. See, e.g., State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 98 A.2d 295, 296 (1953). For a discussion
of the-rule and its abuse by prosecutors, see generally Davis, Limitations Upon the Prose-




label 17 to the accused, capitalizing on the other crimes evidence in the
case, 118 or introducing new ones," 9 to term the defendant a "bad man" or
some equivalent indicating long-standing criminality. Often, this is coupled
with an exhortation that the jury should do its duty by ridding society of
men of this ilk though a conviction. 120 This tactic is in direct conflict with
the principle that other crimes evidence may not be introduced to show de-
fendant's character. Allowing it will nullify judicial efforts to limit other
crimes evidence to that which is relevant to material issues other than charac-
ter, for it permits the prosecutor, at a strategic moment in the trial, to turn
whatever evidence has been admitted into character evidence.
One court has recently indicated an increased concern with the problem
of such flagrant abuses in the prosecutor's statements to the jury by insisting
that full transcriptions be made of the opening and closing statements.' 2 '
The attitude that these forays are part of the evidence in the case, and as
much a cause for reversal as any other evidence improperly introduced, is
a step toward a realistic appraisal of the impact of forensics. But many courts
still insist that these statements are not part of the evidence, and do not
need to be so carefully scrutinized for prejudice as evidence regularly intro-
duced.122
117. Often the label itself may cause reversal. Compare Hill v. State, 144 Tex. Crim.
415, 423, 157 S.W.2d 369, 373 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (in
rape case, jury told that "a snake crawls on his own belly but these human vultures crawl
on the bellies of our hapless and defenseless women"; conviction upheld), with Common-
wealth v. Capalla, 322 Pa. 200, 204, 185 Atl. 203, 205 (1936) (in prosecution for man-
slaughter, accused called "cold-blooded killer"; conviction reversed); and Volkmnor v.
United States, 13 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1926) (in prosecution for using mails to defraud,
defendant called "skunk," "weak-faced weasel," and "a cheap, scaly, slimy crook"; con-
viction reversed). Courts are much harder on comments using national, religious or racial
labels, see Note, 36 CoLum. L. REv. 931, 935 (1936) ; Davis, supra note 116, at 78-79. But
see Quarles v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Ky. 1951) (Prosecutor's statement
in summation that the defendant "is a mean nigger," although "not a proper argument,"
not cause for reversal since harmless.).
118. See, e.g., State v. Van Williams, 212 S.C. 110, 46 S.E.2d 665 (1948) (statement
that it would be unwise to turn loose a man of the character indicated by past convictions).
119. See, e.g., Az Din v. United States, 232 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1956) (accusation of
narcotics addiction in prosecution for peddling dope). Here the court upheld the convic-
tion on two grounds: that an instruction from the judge "corrected" the prejudicial appeal
of the evidence; and that the prejudicial appeal here was not so strong as in two other
cases where convictions were upset.
120. See, e.g., People v. Burnette, 39 Cal. App. 2d 215, 102 P.2d 799 (Dist. Ct. App.
1940); State v. Van Williams, 212 S.C. 110, 46 S.E.2d 665 (1948).
121. State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 144, 98 A.2d 295, 298 (1953) (opinion by Judge,
later Mr. Justice, Brennan).
122. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. tPsv. 277, 294
(1952), concludes: "[T]he final arguments of counsel . . . lie outside the conventional
scope of the subject of evidence . . . ." See Michael & Adler, The Trial of an Issue of
Fact: II, 34 COLUm. L. REv. 1462, 1485 n.21 (1934) ("relaxed and careless manner in
which persuasion is judicially administered") ; Levin & Levy, supra note 112, at 140 ("truly
wide latitude for flights of forensic oratory.").
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The prosecutor may also indulge in forensic misconduct in his presenta-
tion of the case-in-chief or on his cross examination of the accused and other
defense witnesses. In the event of a false allegation of other crimes on cross
examination, the defendant often cannot produce extrinsic proof of his in-
nocence but can only protest in answer; the jury is left to decide the ques-
tion of truth on nothing more than a verbal thrust and riposte, and can
probably be expected to believe the prosecutor's allusions over the denial
of the accused or a witness. 23 Similarly, the significance of other crimes evi-
dence properly admitted to the courtroom may be distorted or simply inflated
by repeated references to it.1 24 Repetition is one of the prosecutor's foremost
weapons for influencing jury decisions. Courts almost invariably allow such
tactics on the ground that the prosecutor may press the defendant on his an-
swer in the hope that he may change it, and admit commission of the crime
suggested. 1 25 Another tactic is the hit-and-run introduction of inadmissible oth-
er crimes evidence, where the prosecutor voluntarily-and not grudgingly or
too casually-retracts a prejudicial remark after placing it before the jury.1 6
Usually, this conduct will not precipitate a mistrial.
There is considerable adverse comment by appellate courts on the trial ex-
cesses of prosecutors. 27 When it is clear that such prejudicial use of other
crimes evidence was decisive in the trial, some courts will not allow a con-
viction to stand.' 28 But when there is some question whether the evidence
was outcome determinative-either because of the strength of other evidence
or the "efficacy" of judicial instructions-the overwhelming number of courts
123. Though truth of allegations cannot be known in individual cases, the kind of
tactic which might be used can often be seen. A conviction for abortion was upheld al-
though the prosecutor repeatedly asked the accused-in the face of at least ten denials-
if she had committed or was recently involved in certain uncharged abortions which had
never been the subject of trial. See excerpts from the trial record, People v. Sorge, 301
N.Y. 198, 93 N.E2d 637 (1950), printed in MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON
EVIDENcE 296-98 (1957).
124. Extended questioning or argument by the prosecutor may cause reversal. See
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935) ; State v. Lindsey, 27 Wash. 2d 186, 177
P.2d 387, aff'd on rehearing, 181 P.2d 830 '(1947). But see note 83 supra.
125. See, e.g., People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. at 200, 93 N.E.2d at 639 ("As long as he
acts in good faith, in the hope of inducing the witness to abandon his negative answers,
the prosecutor may question further."). The "good faith" standard is difficult to adminis-
ter, see Lee Won Sing v. United States, 94 App. D.C. 310, 215 F.2d 680 (1954), and has
been rejected by at least one court which placed the burden on defendant to show "bad
faith," see People v. Fowzer, 127 Cal. App. 2d 742, 749, 274 P.2d 471, 475 (1954).
126. See Note, 36 CoLum. L. Rav. 931, 940-41 & nn.72-74 (1936) ; Davis, supra note
116, at 76 & n.18. This usually is accompanied by some rebuke or comment from the judge.
Note, 36 CoLUm. L. REv. at 941.
127. The classic statement is in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-89 and
asterisk footnote (1935). See also, State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 139-41, 98 A.2d 295, 296
(1953).
128. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935).
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will do no more than verbally admonish, and will take no action. 29 Despite
the known inadequacy of curative measures at the trial level, this reluctance
is understandable in light of the inability to measure prejudicial impact and
the cost to the state of retrials. Yet appellate reticence may breed ever more
frequent abuses. A radical compromise remedy might be suggested. When
a prosecutor is discovered overreaching the limits of truth, a stern reprimand
from the bench with a statement to the jury that the allegation is false seems
an efficacious way to wipe the allegation from the jury's mind. Moreover,
the appearance of judicial disfavor may act as a powerful deterrent to the
prosecutor concerned with maintaining the jury's respect. What would be the
total effect on trial procedure if all other crimes evidence wrongfully intro-
duced were declared false and irresponsible?
Mass Communications Media
News of the accused's criminal past may also reach jurors through news-
papers, magazines, radio, and television.130 Such mass communications media,
motivated at least in part by the audience appeal of sensationalism, quite often
play up the accused's criminal record and reputation. Frequently the media
will expose convictions, arrests, and alleged other crimes not admitted at
trial.131 Zealous reporters may even ferret out and publicize rumored details
of the defendant's past life unknown to the prosecutor. The prejudice oc-
casioned by this evidence when it reaches the juror through mass media pub-
licity may be greater than when it is regularly admitted. 3 2 When contacted
outside the courtroom, it may have the aura of forbidden fruit. Furthermore,
press accounts of the details of a past crime resulting in conviction may be
expansive while in many instances nothing but the kind of crime, the time and
place of conviction, and the sentence imposed would be allowed at trial.' 33 Fi-
nally, the defense is deprived of an opportunity to rebut when the communica-
tion to the jury is outside its purview.
129. Sometimes improper comments are excused as inadvertent or as occurring in the
ardor of advocacy. See Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897); Note, 36
CoLum. L. REv. 931 & n.2 (noting that the cases of abuse reaching the appellate courts
are but a very small proportion of all instances of abuse in the courts) 942-43 (1936).
130. See generally Note, 22 GA. BAR J. 413 (1960); Harvey, Trial By Newspaper,
42 MAss. L.Q. 8 (Mar. 1957); Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 840 (1950); Lewis, Cameras in
Court?-A Growing Debate, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 2, 1960, p. 22, col. 4.
For a brief description of the reporting practices of mass communication media cover-
ing a criminal case see Note, 63 HARV. L. REv. 840, 841-42 (1950). See also Caldwell,
Sensational News in the Modern Metropolitan Newspapers, 23 J. CRIm. L. & CRIM. 191
(1933); Holmes, Crime and the Press, 20 J. CRwm. L. & CRIm. 246 (1930).
131. See Life Magazine, Feb. 17, 1961, p. 43 (reporting current Illinois murder trial,
with mention of evidence that defendant had previously committed a rape with slight
resemblance in inodus operandi).
132. See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) ; Note, 63 HARv. L.
REv. 840, 842-43 (1950).
133. See text at notes 81-84 supra.
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All jurisdictions try to keep jurors from such materials. The most effective
shielding device is undoubtedly keeping a jury "locked up" in one location
from selection until verdict, shut off from broadcasts and papers, and under
the watchful eye of court officers who carefully screen reading material in-
cluding letters. But this practice, once widespread, has been largely abandoned
in favor of freer juror movement during the course of trial. Now, during
recesses or delays in a trial,'courts almost universally permit jury "separation,"
and allow the jurors to go their own ways, unsupervised by court officers.' 34
Separating the jury in this way of course increases the risk that jurors will
get wind of prejudicial publicity about the trial. To minimize this risk, separa-
tion is usually accompanied by judicial imprecation to the jurors not to read,
listen to, or see any items about the trial.' 35 The efficacy of such measures is
doubtful. 3 6
Courts presented with juror exposure to other crimes data in mass com-
munications media must face the difficult problem of evaluating whether in
fact this publicity has prejudiced the jury. An affirmative determination
necessitates a mistrial, new trial, or reversal. Reviewing courts have held,
therefore, that the mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption will not cause
reversal.13 7 Moreover, newspaper articles or other publicity limited to un-
biased reporting of the incidents of trial which took place in the presence of, or
within the hearing of jurors, will not give ground for a claim of prejudice. 38
However, reports involving the criminal record or alleged other offenses of
the accused, particularly in those cases where all the evidence was not admitted
to the jury in the courtroom, are generally considered prejudicial.' 39 Similarly
134. See, e.g., Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ("Under
modern conditions juries are customarily permitted to separate, even over weekends, and,
unless there be exceptional circumstances, they should be permitted to do so."). Further-
more, supervision by court officers does not guarantee elimination of prejudicial contact.
See Davenport v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 628, 148 S.W.2d 1054 (1941) ; State v. Verde,
66 R.I. 33, 17 A.2d 39 (1940).
135. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 250 (1910); Carter v. United
States, 252 F.2d 608, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (court invariably should admonish jury before
separation).
136. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910) (Mr. Justice Holmes'
statement that "the probability that jurors, if allowed to separate, will see something of
the public prints is ... obvious") ; Lewis, supra note 130 ("jurors may be warned not to
read or listen to anything about the case, but no one believes this has much effect").
137. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910) ; Shushan v. United
States, 117 F.2d 110, 115-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941) ; McHenry v.
United States, 276 Fed. 761 (D.C. Cir. 1921). But cf. Meyer v. Cadwalader, 49 Fed. 32
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1891). Also, where it is shown that the offending juror does not remem-
ber the contents of a prejudicial article, he will apparently be held not influenced by it.
See, e.g., United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 787 (1946).
138. See Miller v. Commonwealth, 40 F.2d 820, 822-23 (6th Cir. 1930).
139. See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) ; McKibben v. Phila-
delphia & Reading Ry., 251 Fed. 577, 578 (3d Cir. 1918); United States v. Ogden, 105
Fed. 371 (E.D. Pa. 1900).
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inflammatory is any labeling of the defendant as a bad man, or linking him
with known underworld figures.140
Where evidence of possible "contamination" is presented, the trial judge
may conduct a personal examination of the juror. Prior to the Supreme
Court's 1959 decision in Marshall v. United States,141 if the juror stated that
he would not be influenced by the contact, and if the judge accepted his state-
ment and decided that the verdict would not be tinged, a denial of a motion
for mistrial would generally be upheld. 1 42 The rationale for this affirmance was
that the trial judge is in the best position to decide if the juror has in fact
been prejudiced, and, therefore, must be given a wide discretion in this deter-
mination.143 The Marshall case appears to impose a more stringent test.
Marshall involved a prosecution for the unlicensed dispensing of drugs; during
the course of trial seven jurors read or skimmed newspaper articles stating
that the accused had been convicted previously for forgery and for practicing
medicine without a license. Prior to the appearance of the newspaper accounts,
the trial judge had barred this evidence from trial as unduly prejudicial.
Nonetheless, the court concluded after personal examination of each of the
seven jurors that none would be biased, and instructed each juror not to
consider facts he had learned about the defendant outside the courtroom.
The jury entered a verdict of guilty, and the conviction was affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit. 4 The Supreme Court reversed. While recognizing that great
discretion is allowed the trial judge in cases involving possible prejudice
through contacts with mass media, the Court held that here the newspaper
material was so prejudicial that it made a fair trial impossible. 45 The Court
reasoned that if the information would have been prejudicial if offered at trial,
it would be equally prejudicial if it reached the jury through news accounts. 146
Implicit in the Court's decision, therefore, is a rejection of the notion that
"curative" instructions can cure.147 Marshall seems to require that both trial
140. See Franano v. United States, 277 F.2d 511, 515 (8th Cir. 1960) ; United States
v. Montgomery, 42 F.2d 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (newspaper article called the accused a
swindler, a jailbird, a disbarred lawyer, and an exconvict).
141. 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (opinion per curiam, Mr. Justice Black dissenting without
opinion).
142. See Note, 22 GA. BAR J. 413, 415 (1960).
143. See United States v. Wolf, 102 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Note, 63 HAv.
L. REV. 840, 846-48 (1950). See also United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1951) ;
Thistle v. People, 119 Colo. 1, 199 P.2d 642 (1948). But see State v. Claypoul, 135 Wash.
295, 237 Pac. 730 (1925).
144. 258 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1958).
145. 360 U.S. at 312-13.
146. Ibid.
147. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Mr. Justice Jack-
son's oft-quoted remark: "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome
by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.").
For a deviant and defiant refusal to subscribe to this view, see Ferrari y. Tnited States,
244 F.2d 132, 141 (9th Cir. 1957).
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and appellate courts take a stronger hand in examining jurors for prejudice;
it seems to compel lower courts to analyze the prejudicial content of the infor-
mation separately, and to disregard statements of impartiality when the risk of
prejudice is great.148
The Court's rejection of the efficacy of curative measures brings to light
the difficulty of controlling the prejudicial impact from inadmissible mass
media information. The Supreme Court has held that unless press comment on
a trial creates a "clear and present danger" that the accused will be denied a
fair trial, no controls may be placed on the media. 149 Short of returning to
locking up juries, the only practical solution seems to be the assumption of
responsibility by prosecutors, and by the mass media themselves. Prosecutors
in the Apalachin case, realizing that the lower courts were virtually power-
less to control jury movement, took upon themselves part of the burden of
insuring a trial free of prejudicial press comment. The prosecutors asked the
local press to restrict its comments on the trial, and particularly not to print
the criminal records of the accused, connect them with the underworld figures
or organizations, or castigate them as "bad men," to insure that any possible
sentences would not be reversed because of the prejudicial influence of the
press on jurors.15 0 The press complied and, at least in this respect, the
prosecution was successful. 1 1
148. See Note, 22 GA. BA J. 413, 415 (1960).
The Marshall decision has already had a great influence in the lower federal courts,
see Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; United States v. Alker,
180 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
149. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), followed in Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331 (1946) ; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) ; Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.
v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950). But see
Note, 63 HARV. L. REv. 840, 850-52 (1950). Great Britain, on the other hand, has legis-
lated and enforced the contempt penalty for reporting which goes beyond the fact of arrest
and the bare details of what happens at trial; thus, pre-trial speculation or editorializing
is subject to fine and imprisonment. Id. at 848.
150. See Lewis, supra note 130, at 59, 62. Compare Note, 63 HARV. L. Rav. 840, 852-
53 (1950).
151. Past efforts at self-imposed journalistic restraint, however, undertaken by such
groups as the American Bar Association and the American Society of Newspaper Editors,
have been largely unsuccessful. See Note, 63 HARV. L. REV. at 843-44.
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